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Abstract
The Canterbury earthquake, which struck New Zealand on February 22nd, 2011 
took 186 lives. Of this number, 28 were Japanese overseas students. Looking simply 
at the number of casualties, this may appear to have been a minor earthquake which 
seems incomparable with respect to other major earthquakes. However, this was one 
of the most violent and costly earthquakes recorded in recent years. This was also 
major one in a regional context. The situation was grave: this earthquake caused the 
collapse of the Christchurch Cathedral, a symbolic landmark of the region, and dealt 
a blow to local economic activities due to devastating damage throughout the city’s 
central area. There were also ongoing aftershocks and damage to residences due to 
liquefaction. Now (as of August 2013), over two years after the earthquake, citizens 
are still troubled with uncertainty about the future, and the whole region has become 
exhausted. The earthquake has brought about damage to people that cannot be mea-
sured from the number of casualties alone.
This paper will discuss two aspects of disaster recovery in the earthquake-struck 
area in Christchurch, New Zealand that have set it apart from disaster areas in other 
countries: firstly the issue of national insurance, and secondly, the absence of tempo-
rary housing. According to data provided by reinsurance companies, the amount of 
loss compensation paid out after the Canterbury Earthquake surpasses the amount 
after other earthquakes worldwide—even those that caused tens of thousands of  
fatalities. This is due to the extremely high coverage ratio of the natural disaster  
insurance, which is over 90%. On the other hand, it became apparent that the time 
taken up by insurance-related negotiations and procedures was in fact delaying 
housing reconstruction. Furthermore, there is almost no temporary housing of the 
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variety built in disaster areas in places such as Japan. Although provision of tempo-
rary housing is extremely limited, there is generous official aid offered to the victims. 
This is the particular nature of the disaster recovery after the Canterbury earthquake.
Key words: New Zealand, Canterbury Earthquakes, Christchurch, earthquake insurance, 
temporary accommodation
1. Introduction
New Zealand is situated on a plate boundary much like Japan, and experiences a considerable 
number of earthquakes. In Japan, ‘the Christchurch earthquake’ generally refers to the 
Christchurch earthquake that occurred on February 22nd, 2011, at 12:51am. Due to the existence 
of an English language school in the Canterbury Television (CTV) building that collapsed, many 
Asian overseas students were killed, including 28 Japanese students. Of the 186 casualties of this 
earthquake, 115 of them were caused by the collapse of this building. There had been daily 
coverage of the disaster in Japanese media, with a focus on the Japanese victims, but after the 
Great East Japan Earthquake struck on March 11th, reports from Christchurch received less 
international media attention.
Looking merely at the casualty figures, this disaster does not seem to be in the same magnitude 
of devastation as the Great East Japan Earthquake in Japan, or the Wenchuan earthquake in 
China. However, it has had a considerable societal impact due to the damage caused by 
liquefaction, the ongoing aftershocks, the recurrent earthquakes over M6.0, and the blow to 
economic activities due to the devastation of Christchuch’s city center, including the collapse of 
the Christchurch Cathedral, its symbolic landmark. (It has been damanged and rebuilt four times 
in 150 years.) Even now, in August 2013, over two years after the earthquake, the citizens are 
plagued by uncertainty about the future.
Residences are awaiting damage appraisal or demolition, and the whole region has become 
exhausted. The earthquake has brought about damage to people that cannot be measured by the 
number of fatalities.
This paper will investigate the characteristics of the disaster aid following the Canterbury 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, focusing first on the insurance system, and then on the absence 
of temporary housing. Regarding the first topic of the insurance system, owing to the extent of 
the loss of housing due to liquefaction in Christchurch, many see insurance as the primary issue 
concerning the earthquake. Although the Canterbury earthquake is not among the world’s 
deadliest natural disasters, it is one of the earthquakes with the highest amount of compensation 
paid by insurance companies. New Zealand has a well-established insurance system and housing 
policy in place, and shares background factors with other developed nations such as Japan. In 
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particular, the aging population, so the two nations’ experiences with disaster recovery are 
relevant with respect to each other. It would be interesting to introduce the case of Canterbury 
earthquake to a Japanese Journal of Disaster Recovery and Revitalization. In the disaster areas 
in New Zealand, the issue of insurance is discussed as the primary issue, and it was confirmed 
that the damage was also covered by various insurances that do not exist in Japan.
The second focus of this essay is on the absence of temporary housing that is often built in 
disaster areas. Actual temporary housing could not be confirmed at first, so investigations were 
conducted as to their existence. I could not find any temporary housing, which can be found in 
disaster areas after earthquakes in other nations such as Japan or China, in the urban or suburban 
areas in Christchurch during my visit at the end of November 2011, or the investigation started 
from July 2013. There are temporary school buildings on school campuses, and there are two 
huge clusters of temporary buildings at the University of Canterbury, but no temporary residential 
housing like that found in Japan could be seen anywhere in the city. The situation surrounding 
temporary housing, which is different from that in Japan, will be detailed later in section 4.
2. The Canterbury earthquake
2.1. The Time and Date of the Earthquake
‘The Christchurch earthquake’ refers not only to the earthquake on February 22nd, 2011, 
which was the cause of many casualties, but to a series of earthquakes. Beginning with the 
Darfield earthquake on September 4th, 2010, the second large earthquake happened on February 
2011, and the third on June 13th; within this period, over 7,500 aftershocks were observed.
And on December 23rd, the fourth large earthquake occurred. By this point, approximately 
12,000 aftershocks had been recorded (Table 1).
2.2. Names of earthquakes
These earthquakes are known by various names, so a quick clarification is in order. This series 
Table 1.
Main earthquakes in 2010–2011 included in the Canterbury earthquake
9/4/2010  
Saturday  
4:35 AM
2/22/2011  
Tuesday  
12:51 AM
6/14/2011  
Monday  
2:20 PM
12/23/2011  
Friday  
1:58 PM
Epicenter Darfield 10km southwest  of Christchurch
10km southeast  
of Christchurch
10km northeast  
of Lyttelton
Magnitude M7.1 M6.3 M6.3 M6.3
Fatalities 0 185 0 0
Injuries 6659
Total number of aftershocks 7500+ 12000
Number of collapsed 
buildings
1,300 commercial buildings  
10,000 residences
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of earthquakes is most commonly called the Canterbury earthquake, referring to the name of the 
wider region. It is also known as the Christchurch earthquake, from the name of the city that 
suffered the most damage. There was also a lot of damage at Lyttelton, the port town in the 
outskirts of Christchurch where the British first landed. There, it is also referred to as the 
Lyttelton earthquake, although not in common use. The 2010 earthquake is also known as the 
Darfield earthquake after the town of Darfield, located to the west from the city of Christchurch, 
where the epicenter of the earthquake was.
2.3. Comparison of natural disasters worldwide based on reinsurance company data
Insurance companies are themselves insured, a system known as reinsurance. We will look at 
data released by Munich RE, a major reinsurance company, focusing on the number of deaths, 
amount of loss, and amount compensated by insurance.
First, let us look at the number of fatalities. Table 2 shows the ten deadliest natural disasters 
in the world between 1980 and 2012, in order of death count. The worst was the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, followed by the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. Other than earthquakes, 
the list contains other types of disasters such as the cyclone in Bangladesh, and the heat wave in 
Europe in 2003. Here, the New Zealand earthquake is not in the top ten. (Table 2)
Next, Table 3 shows the top 10 of the same ranking with the type of disaster narrowed down 
to earthquakes, or earthquakes and tsunamis. The Tohoku earthquake is in 9th place; the New 
Zealand earthquake is still outside the list. (Table 3)
Table 2.
Ten deadliest disasters in 1980–2012, in order of number of fatalities
Type of disaster Disaster location
Losses
Losses  
compensated  
by insurance
Number of 
fatalities
Million USD
1/12/2010 Earthquake Haiti 8,000 200 222,570
12/26/2004 Earthquake/Tsunami
Sri Lanka/Indonesia/ 
Thailand/India/Bangladesh/
Myanmar/Maldives/Malaysia
11,200 1,000 220,000
5/2/2008  
to 5/5/2008 Cyclone Nargis/storm Myanmar 4,000 140,000
4/29/1991  
to 4/30/1991 Tropical cyclone/storm Bangladesh 3,000 100 139,000
10/8/2005 Earthquake Pakistan/India/Afghanistan 5,200 5 88,000
5/12/2008 Earthquake Sichuan, China 85,000 300 64,000
July, 2003  
to Aug. 2003 Heat wave
France/Germany/Italy/
Portugal/Romania/Spain/UK 13,800 1,120 70,000
July, 2010  
to Sep. 2010 Heatwave Russia 400 55,000
6/20/1990 Earthquake Iran 7,100 100 40,000
12/26/2003 Earthquake Iran 500 10 26,200
Source: Created from Munich RE’s NatCastSERVICE (03/2013)
5Otani
The following Table 4 ranks disasters in order of the amount of loss instead of the number 
of fatalities. The Tohoku earthquake is in 1st place, and the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake is in 
2nd place. In this ranking, the Christchurch earthquake is at No. 7, even with its population of 
350,000. (Table 4)
Then, Table 5 orders the disasters by the amount of loss covered by insurance. The February 
2011 earthquake in New Zealand is at number 3, and the September 2010 earthquake, in which 
Table 3.
Ten deadliest natural disasters in 1980–2012 in order of number of fatalities
Type of disaster Disaster location
Losses
Losses  
compensated  
by insurance
Number of 
fatalities
USD
01/12/2013 Earthquake Haiti 8,000 200 222,570
12/26/2004 Earthquake/Tsunami
Sri Lanka/Indonesia/ 
Thailand/India/Bangladesh/
Myanmar/Maldives/Malaysia
11,200 1,000 220,000
10/08/2005 Earthquake Pakistan/India/Afghanistan 5,200 5 88,000
05/12/2008 Earthquake Sichuan, China 85,000 300 64,000
06/20/1990 Earthquake Iran 7,100 100 40,000
12/26/2003 Earthquake Iran 500 10 26,200
12/07/1988 Earthquake Armenia/Turkey 14,000 25,000
08/17/1999 Earthquake Turkey 12,000 600 17,118
03/11/2011 Earthquake/Tsunami Eastern Japan, Japan 210,000 40,000 15,840
01/26/2001 Earthquake India 4,600 100 14,970
Source: Created from Munich RE’s NatCastSERVICE (03/2013)
Table 4.
Ten costliest natural disasters in 1980–2012 in order of amount of loss
Type of disaster Disaster location
Losses
Losses  
compensated  
by insurance
Number of 
fatalities
USD
03/11/2011 Earthquake/Tsunami Eastern Japan, Japan 210,000 40,000 15,840
01/17/1995 Earthquake Hanshin, Japan 100,000 3,000 6,430
05/12/2008 Earthquake Sichuan, China 85,000 300 64,000
01/17/1994 Earthquake Northridge, California, USA 44,000 15,300 61
02/27/2010 Earthquake/Tsunami Chile 30,000 8,000 520
10/23/2004 Earthquake Niigata, Japan 28,000 760 46
02/22/2011 Earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand 16,000 13,000 185
05/29/2012, 
06/03/2012 Earthquake Italy 16,000 1,600 18
12/07/1988 Earthquake Armenia/Turkey 14,000 25,000
09/21/1999 Earthquake Nantou County, Taiwan 14,000 750 2,415
Source: Created from Munich RE’s NatCastSERVICE (03/2013)
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there were no fatalities, is the 5th highest in the world. The June 2011 earthquake is also in the 
list at No. 10, and even if we divide the series of large earthquakes in New Zealand into three 
earthquakes, each of them makes it into the top ten in the world. (Table 5)
The scale of natural disasters cannot be compared by the amount of insurance money that was 
paid. What the comparison of the reinsurance company’s data in Tables 2 to 5 shows is that the 
number of fatalities, as well as the amount of loss which are caused by a natural disaster, is in 
no way proportional to the amount of compensation given for insured losses. Because each 
country differs as to the presence of an insurance system, its coverage ratio, and the insured 
objects, the amount paid by insurance varies. In general, there is very little insurance compensation 
in developing countries, even if the death toll is high. On the other hand, in the case of the 
Canterbury earthquake in New Zealand, even though the death toll is low, the amount of loss, 
and furthermore, the amount of compensation for the insured loss, are extremely high compared 
to the world average (Table 4 and 5). Insurance for large-scale natural disasters is not handled 
solely out of an insurance budget targeted at each country; if, as in developed countries, a sound 
insurance system is in place, then insurance money is gathered from all over the world through 
reinsurance companies.
The comparison above shows that the compensation for insured losses is far higher in New 
Zealand than in other countries. New Zealand’s recovery strategy is characterized by its 
government policy that places weight on self-help (the natural disaster insurance system). This 
is connected to the second topic discussed in this paper, that of the absence of temporary housing. 
Table 5.
Ten costliest earthquakes out of natural disasters in 1980–2012 worldwide,  
by amount of compensation for insured losses
Type of disaster Disaster location
Losses
Losses  
compensated  
by insurance
Number of 
fatalities
USD
03/11/2011 Earthquake/Tsunami Eastern Japan, Japan 210,000 40,000 15,840
01/17/1994 Earthquake Northridge, California, USA 44,000 15,300 61
02/22/2011 Earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand 16,000 13,000 185
02/27/2010 Earthquake/Tsunami Chile 30,000 8,000 520
09/04/2010 Earthquake Canterbury, New Zealand 65,000 5,000
01/17/1995 Earthquake Hanshin, Japan 100,000 3,000 6,430
05/29/2012, 
06/03/2012 Earthquake Italy 16,000 1,600 18
12/26/2004 Earthquake/Tsunami
Sri Lanka/Indonesia/Thailand/
India/Bangladesh/Myanmar/
Maldives/Malaysia
11,200 1,000 220,000
10/17/1999 Earthquake Loma Prieta, California, USA 10,000 900 68
06/13/2011 Earthquake New Zealand 2,000 800 1
Source: Created from Munich RE’s NatCastSERVICE (3/2013)
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It is clear that the support system concerning housing differs from in countries such as Japan, 
which favors a system centered on official aid, providing temporary housing. Although the 
government does not offer support by constructing and providing temporary housing for victims 
who lost their homes, there is a system whereby the government-owned EQC (Earthquake 
Commission) pays the expenses for repairing houses and buildings, and covers relocation and 
rental/hotel expenses for a period of time if a person’s home was destroyed, if they are covered 
by natural disaster insurance. Although the construction of temporary housing is indeed 
extremely limited, that is not to say that there are no measures in place to support people 
reconstructing their lives.
2.4. Seeking recovery solutions after the Canterbury earthquake
The EQC mentioned above is an entity which offers relief to people who have suffered damage 
by natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and floods. Each individual takes out fire and 
natural disaster insurance through insurance companies, which pay a set monthly disaster 
insurance premium to the EQC (One simply takes out a content insurance policy (fire, theft, 
other damage etc.) and through this there is a levy that is paid to the EQC for natural disaster 
payment. Thus, if one has purchased contents insurance from any private provider then one is 
enrolled into the EQC scheme.). The EQC pays up to 100,000 dollars in the event of a disaster 
from the collected premium. If the repair costs exceed this amount, then each insurance company 
covers the shortage. The EQC will be described in more detail later in section 3.
After the earthquake in September 2010, the government newly appointed a Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Minister, and established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2010. 
It was announced that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund would be established with 
contributions from the government and private financial institutions. The government contributed 
500 million dollars. As official aid for the victims, the government provided a flat rate benefit 
of 1000 dollars to households evacuating temporarily due to earthquake damage, as well as fixed 
compensation to workers who were forced to suspend their work.
In New Zealand, there were remarkably swift and thorough relief activities conducted by 
government bodies and private organizations, led by the Ministry of Civil Defense Emergency 
Management (CDEM), and the government adopted generous recovery policies to aid the 
victims of the disaster (Kimura-Steven, 2012). The Red Cross, the Salvation Army and World 
Vision are among the key contributing non-for-profit organizations that provided support in the 
aftermath of the disasters. The government set up a fund in collaboration with the Red Cross, 
and provided fixed rent subsidies for disaster evacuees whose private dwellings or rented/
investment homes were damaged. Although it may have a very limited impact, there was also a 
Christian charity organization called Habitat for Humanity, which sought to reconstruct, without 
charge, the damaged homes of those who could not receive support from the EQC due to lack 
of insurance (Kimura-Steven, 2012). There were also volunteer groups such as the Student 
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Volunteer Army (SVA) (Otani, 2014) and the Farmer Volunteer Army, set up to provide 
assistance with labor to clear debris and assist relocation. They helped, for example, by heading 
to disaster areas with tractors and shovels to remove the mud from the liquefaction-damaged 
property. After the natural disaster, the people of Christchurch sought to overcome the difficulties 
together as one, demonstrating a national trait (Kimura-Steven, 2012) that was akin to how the 
Japanese have tackled disaster recovery in the past.
After the February 2011 earthquake, the central government established the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) on March 29th, in order to restore Christchurch. On 
September 10th of the same year, a recovery strategy draft was released, appealing for opinions 
from the general public. A campaign called “Share an Idea”, which lasted for 6 weeks, started 
in May 14th, 2011 and gathered over 100,000 opinions from the public, but was met with 
dissatisfaction from the citizens due to the lack of disclosure of the content of the opinions, and 
of official explanations as to whether the opinions were being reflected in the plan (Otani, 2014).
In December 2012, CERA’s Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) created the 
blueprint for the recovery plan. The intention of this plan was to restore to the devastated Central 
Business District (CBD). Although a clear vision of the newly restored Christchurch will take 
time to emerge, what has become clear in the course of 2012 is that the city will be considerably 
different from how it used to be. Many buildings and facilities will be demolished in the eastern 
part of the city and the CBD, which suffered a lot of damage. This means that places that formed 
not only landmarks and wayfinding and navigation points but also people’s life memories, in 
particular for the elderly, will disappear. The houses where people might have lived frrom 
previsou generations, and the town where they were born and grew up in, where they married 
and raised children, and lived after retirement, will be lost, as will the memories attached to 
them, although the level of mobility in New Zealand is relatively high and people are said to be 
transitent population. Particularly, the approximately 10,000 residences in the eastern part of the 
city, the Port Hills, and other areas were designated within the Red Zone, which were bought by 
the government, and the residents were made to move out. The government also purchased land 
that became unusable after the earthquake at pre-disaster prices, based on results from the 
rateable valuation of a property conducted in 2006. There are also many people who choose this 
time to move out of Christchurch altogether.
CERA has also taken various measures to offer necessary mid-and long-term support, so that 
victims can rebuild their lives. In deciding its policies and programs concerning the victim’s 
livelihood rehabilitation, it referred to the response taken after the mountain fire disaster that 
occurred in Victoria, Australia in 2009 (Denise Kidd, General Manager, Community Resilience, 
Social & Cultural Recovery, CERA, and Jane Morgan of the same program, interview, August 
6th, 2013 and August 19th, 2014).
In the post-earthquake recovery process, the victims’ main interest is the issue of rebuilding 
their homes. Starting immediately after the earthquake in September 2010, the city of 
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Christchurch conducted assessments of the risk level of buildings, and CERA divided the disaster 
area into the red zone, orange zone, white zone and green zone, according to the damage 
situation. (Many of these initial assessments had to be repeated after Feb 2011 and it was 
discovered that assessors had made many mistakes.) The red zone is the area that suffered the 
most serious damage, which has been deemed unfit for living, with no hope of repairing the 
foundation’s defects even with engineering work. It was the Christchurch earthquake that first 
introduced the local population to the earthquake damage known as “liquefaction”. There are 
also areas that have been rendered uninhabitable due to liquefaction, even though the buildings 
are still standing. The government has further divided the areas other than the red zone, e.g. the 
green zone, into TC1, TC2 and TC3 zones, according to the level of damage. These categories 
describe how the land is expected to perform in future earthquakes, and also describe the 
foundation systems most likely to be required in the corresponding areas.
Technical Category 1 (TC1, grey) – future land damage from liquefaction is unlikely. You can 
use standard foundations for concrete slabs or timber floors.
Technical Category 2 (TC2, yellow) – minor to moderate land damage from liquefaction is 
possible in future significant earthquakes. You can use standard timber piled foundations for 
houses with lightweight cladding and roofing and suspended timber floors or enhanced concrete 
foundations.
Technical Category 3 (TC3, blue) – moderate to significant land damage from liquefaction is 
possible in future large earthquakes. Site-specific geotechnical investigation and specific 
engineering foundation design is required.
http://cera.govt.nz/residential-green-zone-technical-categories/overview
Housing and land in the designated red zone, which are difficult to repair or reconstruct, fall 
under the government policy to buy up houses in the area. The government offered two options 
to all those who applied to private insurance and EQC: sell the land and the house; or only sell 
the land, with the house to be repaired or rebuilt by private insurance and the EQC (Takeda, 
2014). Either way, people in the red zone ultimately have no choice but to move out. TC3 has 
problems with the foundation; no conclusion has been reached regarding TC2, as various 
negotiations are still in progress due to foundations requiring reinforcement (Campbell, 2014). 
The land zoning changed over time with some land zoned red and then changed. Many arguments 
and legal challenges are ongoing. Citizens face different fates even on opposite sides of one road, 
with the area segmented into different zones. CERA released an estimate in June of 2011 that 
around 5,000 houses will be designated within the red zone. Afterwards, the number of irreparable 
houses and area grew, and when the survey concluded at the end of 2012, over 8,000 buildings 
in an area spanning 630 hectares were designated as a red zone (The Press, 2013: 46).
The New Zealand government has also bought up houses in the designated red zone at their 
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appraised values before the disaster, which totaled to a sum of 1 billion NZ dollars (The Press, 
2013: 4). Although the majority opinion was that the purchase prices were adequate, in reality 
there are problems on an individual scale, such as what happens with buildings that were 
extended between the time of appraisal and the earthquake. Furthermore, there are in reality 
complex issues surrounding the EQC and insurance. Miles (2012) introduces such cases, as well 
as dissatisfactions from the people.
Many have pointed to the political factor as one of the factors delaying recovery. It is an 
important issue that Christchurch’s citizens and local government are unable to formulate 
recovery plans on their own terms, due to the increased authority of the central government and 
lack of effective participatory democracy in the region before and after the earthquake. This is 
also related to the fact that recovery cannot be achieved with the city’s financial means alone, 
and requires vast amounts of financial support from the entire country. Under such circumstances, 
citizens have voiced disapproval of the subjection to the policies of the central government in 
the capital, Wellington, there have been demonstrations in the city of Christchurch.
The eastern part of Christchurch, where damage was comparatively large, is an area with a 
comparatively low socio economic status (SES) (Campbell, 2014). The earthquake shone a 
brighter light on the disparity between the different areas of Christchurch, which is a social issue 
of the city with a clear geographic and socioeconomic divide in the city since early settlement 
historically. This disparity has also been a factor in the gap in the speed of rehabilitation and 
recovery in different areas.
The earthquake of September 4th, 2010 occurred five weeks before the election scheduled for 
October. The earthquake increased the popularity of Mayor Bob Parker, for whom public support 
had been waning, and he was re-elected over his rival candidate Jim Anderton. However, the 
next three years proved a difficult time for the mayor. After CERA’s establishment, the chief 
executive Roger Sutton (appointed May 2011, but forced to resign in 2014 after being found 
guilty of serious misconduct) became more powerful than the mayor; the media even reported 
in cynicism that Gerry Brownlee, the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, had more 
authority than Prime Minister John Key. All decisions came to made in Wellington, the capital 
of New Zealand, and Christchurch’s city council and citizens began to be dissatisfied with the 
disintegration of democracy, leading to demonstrations. In October 2013, Lianne Dalziel, a local 
Labour Party MP for Christchurch East, was elected and became the new mayor of Christchurch, 
a possible testament to the citizen’s dissatisfaction, as well as to their hopes for restored 
autonomy on the road to recovery.
3. Earthquake insurance in New Zealand
The Earthquake Commission (EQC), New Zealand’s earthquake insurance, was not established 
for the purpose of dealing with this earthquake specifically. First, I will provide an explanation 
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of a quick outline of how the organisation was born. New Zealand’s public earthquake insurance 
was established in 1945 as the Earthquake and War Damage Fund—now known as the 
Earthquake Commission—following the earthquake that struck its capital city of Wellington in 
1942. There were considerable legal changes in 1993, and the organization became a corporation 
owned entirely by the government. It has a history of around 60 years, and is an insurance system 
that cannot be found in Japan. Insurance provided by the EQC is called the EQ cover. It is 
automatically attached when buying house contents insurance from a private insurance company. 
Purchase is compulsory (Purchase of home/contents insurance is not compulsory, but entry into 
the EQC scheme is compulsory if you have purchased insurance), and the automatic enrolment 
rate is high, at 90%. When buying houses, people take out insurance from a private insurance 
company that combines fire insurance and natural disaster insurance (When one buys a contents 
policy, EQC makes up the disaster portion.). People receiving a loan from a bank must buy 
insurance beforehand. Unlike in Japan, there is no need to take out separate earthquake insurance, 
and so there is no special insurance in New Zealand for earthquakes. The insurance premium is 
cheaper than in Japan. Unlike the Japanese earthquake insurance system, the insured object 
includes land, not just buildings and household goods. The EQC serves as the reinsurance 
company for housing insurance.
There is an upper limit to the EQC’s compensation, and the excess is covered by insurance 
companies. The EQC’s maximum amount for housing is 100,000 NZ dollars. If housing is 
uninhabitable due to damage, the shortage is covered by private insurance, as this sum is not 
sufficient for reconstruction. Housing insurance is provided by the government-run EQC and 
private insurance companies. Damage to household goods due to natural disasters is also included 
in the EQC’s insurance. The EQC’s maximum compensation is 20,000 NZ dollars, and the 
shortage is compensated by the insurance company.
EQC accumulates the insurance premium as a natural disaster fund, and uses the fund for 
foreign stocks (approx. 30%), government debt (approx. 60%), and cash deposit (approx. 10%) 
under government monitoring; the fund balance before the 2010 Canterbury earthquake had 
risen to 5.6 billion NZ dollars.
In addition to managing funds for natural disaster recovery, the EQC conducts investigation, 
research, and education concerning natural disasters and disaster prevention measures, issues 
research grants, and invests in the GeoNet project, which is New Zealand’s earthquake 
monitoring project. With the continuing aftershocks after 2010, it has become a new custom 
for citizens to search for information such as the seismic intensity on the GeoNet website 
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/) after each aftershock.
From the victims’ perspective, the biggest issue with the EQC is that despite the system, the 
actual procedures take an enormous amount of time, and people are kept waiting. In the case of 
a natural disaster such as this, with a vast number of applications, people often do not know when 
the appraisers will come to assess the damage status. Even just looking at the damage from the 
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September 2010 earthquake, only 73,000 appraisals had been conducted between the occurrence 
of the earthquake and January 5th, 2011, before the earthquake in February 2011; and it has been 
reported that repair cost had only been paid to 24,000 of these cases (Kimura-Steven, 2012: 91). 
Although one of the reasons is the continuing aftershocks, there is much discontent about the 
waiting time for the appraisals. The EQC received over 459,000 applications, and it has only 
been able to process and resolve under a quarter of them by the end of 2012. It has apparently 
resolved 26% of the land applied for, 31% of the buildings, and 81% of the buildings’ contents 
(The Press, 2013: 21). Each application contains at least two of the above three. There are also 
people who are negotiating with private insurance besides governmental insurance. Even after 
the EQC’s approval, they have to wait for a long time again to negotiate with insurance 
companies. Furthermore, the wait for the compensation in fact comes in many steps: deciding 
the manner of compensation, i.e. whether the insurance company will commission a repair 
company, or pay out a specific amount of compensation; when the repairers commissioned by 
the insurance company will come, and so on. And these all add to the stress felt by those affected 
by the earthquakes. In New Zealand, a country with a comparatively small population to begin 
with, few companies enter the market, and as the number of repair companies and construction 
companies is also limited, there is skepticism among the victims concerning the monopolization 
by these limited companies. In order to make up for the shortage of workers at the construction 
sites, migrant workers were called in, not only from rural areas all over New Zealand, but also 
from the Philippines or as far as Ireland.
As 90% of the under-30 population do not own a home, only a small number apply for 
insurance money (The Press, 2013: 21), although many renters had contents insurance and 
would have submitted a small claim. On the other hand, the elderly are struggling with the 
bureaucratic processes involved in insurance application. In this sense, young people without 
home ownership certainly have a little more freedom. However, New Zealand’s aging population 
issue had already been progressing since before the earthquake, including in Christchurch; if the 
accelerating trend of young people leaving the city after the disaster continues, then in 20 years, 
after 2030, it has been estimated that half of the city’s population will be over 65. (The Press, 
2013: 22);
Accommodation expenses for hotels and motels, which are not covered by the EQC’s 
earthquake insurance, is compensated by the earthquake rider that is attached to the fire insurance 
for household goods. In terms of residential properties, the premium rate for the earthquake rider 
is uniform across the country, like the EQC’s earthquake insurance. Many insurance companies 
use the premium rate calculated by reinsurance companies such as Munich RE and General Re. 
AMI, the third biggest insurer in the industry, went bankrupt due to the payments for the damage 
of the Canterbury earthquake.
The reinsurance market deteriorated after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York on September 11th, 2001. For this reason, the EQC had been renewing negotiations 
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about reinsurance since 2002 by increasing deductibles, and adjusting the reinsurance 
arrangements, taking into account the reinsurance market situation and the increase level of the 
natural disaster fund. After the Canterbury earthquakes after 2010, the premiums in New Zealand 
have been under review. It has been even estimated to increase by 30% (Miles, 2012).
4. Housing for earthquake victims
4.1. Ordinary residences
After the earthquake, most victims have gone to live in ordinary housing with relatives and 
others, or have continued to live in damaged houses. There are some who continue to live in the 
designated red zone even though the supply of water and electricity have already been cut, 
because they have no prospects of alternative housing. Some citizens had been negotiating for 
an extension of the evacuation deadline, unable to leave before the set date which was July 31st, 
2013. If people need to stay for a few weeks in a hotel or motel while their house is under repair, 
insurance compensates around 150 NZD per night for accommodation.
4.2. Temporary Accommodation Service (CETAS)
As stated in the introduction, temporary housing of the kind seen in disaster areas elsewhere 
in the world is not found in the disaster area in the Canterbury region. As the existence of 
temporary housing is generally not known, or reported in the media, even the university 
earthquake researchers that the author interviewed responded that there was none in the area. 
Interviews also revealed that around 1,000 campervans had been installed as temporary housing 
in an inconvenient place away from the city center, which were then ultimately taken away 
when only one person had moved in (Otani, 2014). People who lost their homes evacuated to 
the homes of friends and relatives in Christchurch or other parts of New Zealand. After 
the earthquake, flight tickets for Air New Zealand were provided at low prices as a part of a 
policy that promoted wide-area evacuation, encouraging people who were able to leave the 
disaster-stricken cities for other cities to do so, so as not to hinder the post-disaster work, and to 
escape the danger posed by aftershocks. So, encouraged to evacuate over a wide area, people 
moved to other cities in New Zealand, or to Australia. There were also programs that allowed 
University students to transfer to different Universities in New Zealand and Australia.
There was a photograph in the monthly newsletter “Canterbury Recovery Update,” published 
by CERA, of ‘a family living happily in the temporary housing at Linwood Park’, which finally 
confirmed the presence and appearance of some temporary housing. As a result, after inquiring 
at the Ministry of Social Development, it was discovered that there were four temporary housing 
villages which were located in parks. Accompanied by Ministry staff, this author visited the 
temporary housing, which had been built in the wooded areas in parks so large that even the 
Ministry staff could not find their way. It is a distance away from nearby residential areas. Each 
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location houses 20 to 40 units, a small number in comparison to temporary housing in Japan in 
terms of the number of households. They are one-story prefabricated buildings, but with sizable 
kitchens and bathrooms, with two or three bedrooms each. There are some units with four 
bedrooms. Each unit is independent, and does not share a wall with the adjacent prefabrication. 
Pets are allowed at all units, and each unit has a back garden, where up to two dogs can be kept. 
Residents can also keep cats, and there is a cat flap attached to the door. Most are unfurnished, 
and residents move in with their own furniture; however, a few of the units come with furniture. 
There were units where people could move in easily, with their own furniture still in storage. 
(Table 6)
The prefabricated temporary housing in Linwood Park and Rawhiti Domain were built on 
land leased from the park with a limit of a few years. The Kaiapoi Domain houses to the north 
of the city are the same. With the Rangers Park housing, the government purchased the land, and 
the temporary housing was under construction as at August 2013. After using the buildings as 
temporary housing for around two years, the plan is not only to sell the land back to the park, 
but to sell the buildings as residences. The average length of stay at the temporary housing is 
42 days, a fact that demonstrates that temporary housing is regarded in a different way from in 
Japan. Furthermore, the housing is not free, but rented at market price. The rent, which is covered 
by insurance, is shown in Table 7.
The designs of the temporary housing built in Christchurch were modeled after the housing 
built after the forest fire disasters in Australia (David Griffiths, Manager of CETAS, and Quality 
Table 6.
4 temporary housing locations in Canterbury
Kaiapoi Domain: 22 units
Rawhiti Domain (New Brighton): 20 units
Linwood Park: 42 units
(The above three locations are on temporary lease from the parks)
Rangers Park (Linwood): 40 units (of which 18 are detached 2–4 bedroom houses; 22 are terraced housing 
with 3 bedrooms)
(Expenses: 12.5 million NZ dollars including cost of land)
Source: The Press, “Quake homes bring relief,” September 18th, 2013, p. A8
Table 7.
Rent of temporary housing
Detached two-bedroom house 282 NZD/week (22,960 yen)
Detached two-bedroom house (furnished) 355 NZD/week (28,400 yen)
Three-bedroom detached house or townhouse 353 NZD/week (28,240 yen)
Detached four-bedroom house 439 NZD/week (35,120 yen)
Source: The Press, “Quake homes bring relief”, September 18th, 2013, p. A8
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Adviser Tania Ohlson, interview, 08/14/2013). However, the situations are different for the 
houses burnt down completely by bushfires in Australia, and the houses damaged by earthquake 
in New Zealand.
4.3. Development of post-disaster residences
Housing for 20,000 households are planned to be built in the suburbs by 2017. There are 
plans for construction of 1,000 dwellings in Rolleston (2,000 inhabitants) in the Selwyn District, 
and the population is estimated to rise by a few thousand (The Press, 2013: 140); other reports 
state that the planned number is as high as 4,000. Other than Selwyn District, which is in the 
western suburbs, there is large-scale residential development in the Waimakariri District in the 
northern suburbs, such as Pegasus Bay, and model houses are advertised in various places. 
Extensive construction of detached houses is under way, but many have expressed doubt in the 
urban planning, commenting on the lack of shopping centers, sports facilities, schools and so 
on. All of these locations are existing growth areas in Canterbury. It is difficult to differentiate 
between planned housing associated with disaster relocation and that which was already 
planned for.
At the home of an Auckland University academic, located in Rolleston in the western suburbs 
of Christchurch, administrative bodies had purchased the underground rights below the orchard 
and were conducting drainage works, as there were plans for construction of residential areas 
on the other side.
Pegasus Bay has been developed on a drained coastal wetland. Although the area spreads 
around a lake and golf courses, redevelopment is taking place in this area which suffered 
liquefaction damage in the earthquake. Rolleston, too, is very close to the epicenter of the 
September 2010 Darfield earthquake, and there are doubts whether safety had been confirmed, 
for example by active fault research, before commencing development.
Image 1. Temporary housing at Kaiapoi
(photograph taken by the author, 08/2013) Image 2. Temporary housing at Linwood Park
(photograph taken by the author, 08/2013)
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5. Ministry of Social Development (MSD):  
Earthquake Support Co-ordination Service (ESCS)
The Earthquake Support Co-ordination Service (ESCS) was established by the Ministry of 
Social Development (MSD) after the earthquake in September 2010, and has since been 
conducting support programs to help rebuild lives, including housing, in cooperation with 
insurers. More specifically, it has engaged in five activities: the helpline (toll-free), temporary 
housing, Earthquake Support Coordinators, support center for homeowners in a red zone area 
(Avondale Earthquake Assistance Centre), and the Community Resilience Team. (Takeda, 2014) 
As citizens have had to deal with many processes for the first time due to the earthquake, such 
as earthquake insurance, the ESCS has served to provide them with information about earthquake 
response, and to direct them to points of contact appropriate to each situation. Rather than merely 
handling situations over the toll-free helpline, the Earthquake Support Coordinators act as guides 
to services required by the victims concerning residences or reconstruction. People affected by 
the earthquake can meet the Coordinators anywhere they wish, including at the evacuated 
home. There were around 70 ESCs at the peak of its activities, but at present (as at August 2013), 
the number has fallen to 40 (Maria McEntyre, ESCS Senior Regional Relationship Manager, 
Family & Community Services, interview, 08/08/2013). Although it has mainly offered 
one-to-one support (individual guidance) until now, it is seeking to shift to a one-to-the-
community system. ESCS has been run by NGO employees, social workers, and people with 
various skills such as community development specialists. Administrative bodies have pointed 
out that the social workers and counseling specialists tend to become too engaged with individual 
cases, rather than observe the originally intended approach of directing victims to ESCS’s 
contacts, then checking afterwards if they have managed to use the service. By constantly 
Image 3. Temporary Housing Application Office at the Ministry of Social Development
(08/2013, photograph taken by the author)
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tending to the victims and spending a long time dealing with each case, the problem is that the 
victims become too dependent. As mentioned earlier, the average length of stay in temporary 
housing is 42 days. There are occasional cases of residents staying for a year, but they are seen 
as problematic by administrative bodies. This was a topic of debate at the temporary housing in 
Kobe, one of the disaster areas of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. This program is a temporary 
post-disaster measure, set to conclude in June 2014 (as scheduled at time of interview in August 
2013). This date is seen as an appropriate time for the insurance companies to take over the work 
that is originally theirs, rather than continue to leave it in the hands of the government.
6. Conclusion
This paper discussed two aspects of the disaster areas in Christchurch, New Zealand, based 
on investigations conducted there, that set them apart from disaster areas in other countries: the 
issue of insurance and the issue of the absence of temporary housing. Christchurch has differed 
from past disaster areas such as in Japan in these two points; as such, it serves as a case study 
that shows the importance of international comparative research. As the coverage ratio of 
earthquake insurance is extremely high, though not total, in New Zealand, housing reconstruction 
might generally be expected to proceed more smoothly than in Japan; however, in reality, 
due to the long wait for the appraisals, and as each step of the negotiations is complex and 
time-consuming, reconstruction has not been a simple process.
The New Zealand government does not actively build or provide temporary housing like the 
Japanese government, but it endeavors to offer other forms of official aid to victims so that 
they may rebuild their lives. Its official aid can be said to be deeply relevant to the concepts 
of “social capital” and “resilience”, keywords that have entered common use in recent research 
on natural disasters.
In Japan, since the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, restoration of disaster areas has centered 
on public works to sort out the urban infrastructure. This style of restoration has been termed 
“pre-established restoration” (Oyane, 2015). The Disaster Relief Act enacted in 1948 after World 
War Two, and the later Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihood of Disaster 
Victims (1997) after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake led to a uniform procedure for recovery 
whereby the official system prescribes the victims’ livelihood rehabilitation, from shelters to 
temporary housing, followed by reconstruction of residential buildings or settlement in public 
post-disaster housing. When the Great Sichuan earthquake occurred in China in 2008, the 
Chinese government issued a notice to researchers to study Japanese precedents as reference in 
devising measures regarding construction of temporary housing and other matters (Otani, 2009 
& 2014). However, now after three and a half years since the Tohoku earthquake, the newspapers 
on September 11th, 2014 reported that only 10% of the planned disaster recovery residences are 
complete, and that more than half the victims in a survey responded that the delay in recovery is 
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most felt in housing issues. Under such circumstances, there have been reports that victims who 
do not rely on official aid, or move into shelters or temporary housing, are managing to rebuild 
their lives faster (Shigekawa, 2015). Even though the earthquake insurance system and housing 
policies in New Zealand are different from those in Japan, both countries are developed countries 
with an aging population. As such, it is valuable to learn from each other’s experience in order 
to plan a desirable recovery.
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